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TO TAX OR NOT TO TAX?
WHAT IS IT WORTH?
by
ADRIAN MIHALACHE*
In the romantic years of cyberspace (1995-2000), the e-commerce was exempt from  
VAT. Upon the 2000 USA election, the candidate George W. Bush promised to  
keep the situation as such. Nowadays, “to tax or not to tax” is no longer the ques-
tion. We try, based on an analysis within a mathematical framework, to answer the  
more meaningful question, “how much to tax?” First, we examine the issue of the  
origin versus the destination principle. Then, we review the various means of tax-
ing in the EU and USA. Finally, we propose a mathematical model that provides  
an optimum for VAT, taking into account the gains of the suppliers, as well as the  
consumer surplus.
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1. DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXATION
Taxation is a main jurisdiction issue with important economical and politic-
al consequences. The Boston tea-party rebellion was a reaction to the taxa-
tion of tea as it physically landed on American shores. It resulted eventually 
in the Independence War that is a turning point in the history of mankind. 
Without taxes, the state cannot fulfill its main functions: maintaining public 
order, ensuring national defense, providing social services, subsidizing edu-
cation and culture. The question “to tax or not to tax?” is therefore not a 
Hamlet-like one. The problem is to find a proper, fair and reasonable type 
of taxation. An optimal decision is essential both in direct and indirect taxa-
tion.  In emergent countries,  such as Romania,  the direct  income tax at a 
unique rate, irrespective of the revenue (i.e. not a progressive one) was in-
troduced in 2004 and maintained after the 2008 elections. Looking back, this 
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bold decision,  controversial  as it  may have seemed at  first  sight,  proved 
highly beneficial. It fostered the economic development of the country and 
did not deprive the government of revenues from tax money since, as an 
after effect, most of the grey economy came into the open. The unfairness of 
a unique rate for the income taxed can be compensated for by the indirect 
value-added tax. The rich buy more, thus they pay more taxes. Moreover, 
this  indirect tax provides a continuous flow of cash towards the govern-
ment. A tendency to increase the weight of the value-added tax compared 
to the one of the income tax is characteristic for the most developed eco-
nomies. However, the globalization of the world economy requires a con-
sistency in the principle of taxation. At present, there are two principles: the 
origin principle, and the destination principle. According to the first, taxa-
tion is applied where the products are developed; according to the second, 
taxation takes place where the products are consumed. The coherence of in-
ternational commerce depends on the application of these principles in two 
different countries. 
1.1. DESTINATION PRINCIPLE IN TWO COUNTRIES
We consider the situation where two countries apply both the destination 
principle (the case of EU). We make the following notations: 
H = home country
F = foreign country
pi = price, i=H, F
ti = tax, i=H, F 
Δ = shipment cost
In country H, the condition for a customer to buy an indigenous product is 
that its price plus taxes is less that the price of the foreign product plus the 
same tax, plus the shipment cost:
In H: pH+tH < pF+tH+Δ, that is pH < pF+Δ
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In country F, the situation is similar, so that the condition for the customer 
to buy an indigenous product is: 
In F: pF+tF < pH+ tF+Δ, that is pF < pH+Δ
Hence, we derive an important conclusion.  The decision of the customer 
does not depend on the level of the value-added tax, which may be different 
for each country. In the European Union, the VAT varies from 15% to 25%. 
However,  such  differences  do  not  have  any  impact  on  the  customer’s 
choice, when no barriers are set in international trade. 
1.2. ORIGIN PRINCIPLE IN TWO COUNTRIES
Suppose that both countries apply the origin principle. In this case, the con-
dition for a customer from H to buy an indigenous product is: 
In H: pH+tH < pF+tF+Δ
Similarly, the condition for a citizen from F to buy an indigenous product is: 
In F: pF+tF < pH+tH+Δ
Consequently, the decision of the customer is influenced by the differences 
in the value-added tax. This accounts for the preference for the destination 
principle in the European Union. 
1.3. COMBINATION OF THE
DESTINATION AND ORIGIN PRINCIPLES
An interesting situation arises when the two trading countries adopt differ-
ent taxation principles. Suppose that country H applies the destination prin-
ciple and country F the origin principle that is:
H = destination principle
F = origin principle
Then, the customer from H buys from F if and only if:
pF+tH +Δ < pH+tH, that is pH  > pF+Δ 
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On the other hand, the customer from F buys from H if and only if:
pH+Δ < pF+tF
A ludicrous cross-hauling situation may arise if:
pF+Δ < pH < pF+tF – Δ
This means that, if the shipment cost is sufficiently low, Δ < tF/2 (half of the 
tax from country F), it is reasonable for all the citizens of one country to buy 
products from the other country. This result strengthens the importance for 
all the countries to adopt the destination principle. However, the European 
Union practiced, albeit for a limited time period, the origin principle, in or-
der to undercut prices on the US market [Siliafis 2007, pp 141-155].
2. TAXING E-COMMERCE
Any technological development is a challenge to the method of taxation and 
e-commerce is a good example for this issue. At first, e-commerce was not 
taxed. In 1998, the US Congress passed (and the president later signed) the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) that imposed a three-year moratorium on 
taxing Internet access. This moratorium on Internet access taxation was re-
newed in 2001. At issue is whether it is fair or not for customers to have the 
choice  of  sitting  in  their  den at  their  computers  ordering  whatever  they 
want (or need) at effectively lower prices (because sales taxes are not due) 
to be delivered to their doorsteps in a matter of days versus customers get-
ting out and buying those same goods at neighborhood stores,  which of 
course must charge higher prices because sales taxes must be paid. Giving 
such a competitive advantage to e-commerce can be explained by the need 
to help develop the “new economy” and also by the externality effect: on-
line offer is bound to increase the demand. Moreover, it would have been 
unwise to impose a taxing jurisdiction without having the means to enforce it.
The rationale for taxing e-commerce is essentially one of fairness. Store-
front businesses are expected to collect local and state sales taxes, with few 
exceptions. Many of these businesses are small, locally owned shops that 
also  do  not  benefit  from the  economies  of  scale  afforded by centralized 
warehouses and supply-chain automation. Giving online stores a tax-free 
pass effectively discounts everything they sell by 5 to 10 percent. However, 
if  the e-commerce deals with digital  products,  it  is  next to impossible to 
check if the taxes have been duly collected. The usual method of verifying 
this is the audit of the inventory of the company. The digital product can be 
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sold several times and still it may be “owned” by the company. The only 
possibility would be tracing the online transactions via the bank services. 
Under the present circumstances (early 2009), the banks would accept al-
most any arrangement, because,  considering the financial  crisis,  they are 
more or less at the mercy of governments. However, they will eventually re-
vert to their usual policy of discretion. In conclusion, it is pointless to pro-
mulgate a jurisdiction on taxation of digital products, because of the diffi-
culties to enforce it. That is why we consider in the sequel only e-commerce 
with tangible products that can be ordered online. Suppose that the online 
offer is based in country F, and the delivery company, based in country H, 
levies the value-added tax on all e-commerce transactions, based on the des-
tination principle. The correctness of the procedure can be checked by an 
audit of the delivery company inventory. 
We propose a comparative analysis of the following situations:
e-commerce and retail are equally taxed;
e-commerce is exempt from taxation;
e-commerce is taxed less than traditional retail.
For each situation an overall welfare index will be computed, taking into 
account the consumer surplus, the producer surplus and the revenues from 
the taxes. Note that the producer surplus is taken into account only if the 
supplier and the retailer are based in the same country, i.e. H=F. The con-
sumer surplus and the producer surplus are represented in figure 1, which 
depicts the basic condition of equilibrium between demand and offer. The 
consumer surplus is the sum of all the differences between the price a cus-
tomer is willing to pay and the price that he or she actually pays (area of tri-
angle CS). The producer surplus is the sum of the differences between the 
market price and the marginal cost of the producer (area PS). The producer 
surplus is considered only when the supplier is based in the same country H.
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Fig. 1. Consumer surplus and producer surplus 
2.1. EQUAL TAXATION OF E-COMMERCE AND RETAIL
Our basic assumption is that the presence of e-commerce stimulates the de-
mand, by an externality effect: information obtained online increases the in-
terest in the products. Consequently, the demand curve moves to the right, 
which implies that the price for the volume xm rises to qm, for the retail 
stores. However, the online price will be less, that is c+t+γ, where:
c is the marginal cost;
t is the value added tax;
γ is the delivery cost.
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Consequently,  the additional  volume of merchandise  sold online  will  be 
x1-xm (fig. 2)
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Fig. 2. Additional volume of merchandise sold online
The shaded triangles from figure 2 represent the consumer surplus for the 
customers who buy from the shop and online respectively. The shaded rect-
angles represent the producer surplus (if we deal with an internal supplier), 
the revenue of the delivery company and the revenues from the taxes.
2.2. TAX-FREE E-COMMERCE
If the e-commerce is  not taxed, one should consider separately the cases 
when the delivery cost is less than or greater than the value-added tax. Sup-
pose the last situation is true, that is γ>t. Figure 3 describes the case. The on-
line price is c+γ, which implies that the additional quantity bought online is 
x2-xm, more than in the previous case. The areas of the shaded triangles 
represent the consumer surplus for retail and e-commerce respectively. The 
areas of the rectangles give the producer surplus (if the supplier is internal), 
the revenue of the delivery company and the tax revenue. 
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Figure 3. Tax free e-commerce with γ>t
Suppose now that the e-commerce is not taxed and that the delivery cost γ 
is less than the tax t. The situation is described in figure 4. The online price 
is as low as c+γ, which corresponds to an additional online offer x3-xm. The 
shaded areas of the two triangles represent the consumer surplus of the re-
tail and e-commerce respectively. The shaded rectangles are the producer 
surplus, the delivery company revenue and the revenue from taxes. 
2.3. PREFERENTIAL TAXATION OF E-COMMERCE
These two situations concerning exemption of e-commerce from taxes sug-
gest that a sensible procedure would be to tax e-commerce, but to a lesser 
extent than retail commerce, taking into account the delivery cost. The pref-
erential VAT for e-commerce will be tE=t-γ. Although this solution seems 
reasonable, one should take into account the fact that the delivery costs dif-
fer from one tangible product to another, so that the value-added tax should 
be  differentiated  too.  This  would  imply  additional  administrative  costs, 
which would make taxation inefficient. The case for preferential taxation of 
e-commerce is presented in figure 5. 
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Figure 4. Free-tax e-commerce with delivery cost less than the VAT (γ<t)
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Figure 5. Preferential taxation of e-commerce (tE=t-γ)
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3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Debates upon the taxation of e-commerce are often based on ideological 
reasons. Fairness is considered the clue for a reasonable decision. Our at-
tempt is to provide a neutral, mathematical argument which can shed more 
light on the issue. To tax or not to tax is  a dilemma which can be easily 
solved by taking into account  the overall  welfare of  a  community,  com-
posed of consumer surplus, producer surplus and revenues from taxes.
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